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Protective Capital and Poverty Traps 
 
Dr. Ali Saedvandi1 
                               
Abstract 
 
We investigate a protective role for capital and the implications on 
poverty reduction policies. Within the framework of an overlapping 
generations model, the accumulation of tax-funded ‘protective 
capital’ increases the survival probability of productive capital from 
disastrous events.  Key findings highlight how a low survival 
probability of capital can stimulate a shift to higher or lower early 
consumption, which might result in escapable or inescapable traps. 
The model explains that injection of capital can be ineffective if the 
required level of protection has not been attained.  We show how 
higher TFP assists wage tax system to escape from traps. 
 
JEL: I32, O19, O41 
 




Disasters, natural or human-made, can take place anywhere in the world regardless 
of the income level of the people affected. Developed nations can incur large 
amounts of damages from catastrophic events in absolute terms; however, less 
developed countries witness more destructive impacts from disasters on the lives of 
inhabitants, particularly when losses are compared with their income level. 
 
The fact is that people of the less developed countries (LDCs)—which are very 
likely also highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs) in Sub-Saharan Africa, Latin 
America, and Asia—are more vulnerable to natural disasters. According to a United 
Nations’ report (2008), the frequency of disasters per year increased from 78 to 351 
during 1970-2006. As a matter of fact, the average number of casualties for each 
disaster has been on a declining trend. In contrast, the total number of people 
affected by natural hazards and the estimated costs of damages has sharply 
increased. The UN report concludes, ‘As disasters have become less life-
threatening, they have become more threatening to the well-being of the 
communities that are hit’ (Page 81).  
 
The current work attempts to elucidate a relationship between disastrous events 
and the possibility of the occurrence of poverty traps. The paper suggests that 
calamities can produce rather short-term damages in developed nations, contrasting 
with the long-term catastrophic consequences in LDCs and HIPCs, because of the 
magnitude of losses relative to the GDP in poorer nations. This notion can be 
supported by the data on the estimated cost of the worst damages relative to income 
in the past 30 years. According to United Nations (2008), while the 1980 earthquake 
in Italy, among OECD countries, is recorded as the costliest natural event (4.3 
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percent of the GDP) in the last 50 years, damages in less developed nations can 
amount to multiple times of their income; for instance, a loss of 309 percent of the 
GDP in North Korea in 2005.  
Our model shows that poor societies are unable to fend off the catastrophic 
impacts of disastrous events on their productive capital unless some particular level 
of protective capital has already been accumulated. One negative consequence of 
this issue is that LDCs that obtain lesser amounts of protective capital than the 
required threshold level are susceptible to being entrapped in poverty in an 
inescapable steady-state, which might render traditional poverty reduction policies 
ineffectual. 
An extensive body of literature exists on the causes of the poverty trap. Azariadis 
(2006) categorizes theories in this field into three groups: threshold effects, 
institutions, and neighbourhood effects. This paper develops a ‘threshold effect 
model’ based on the endogenous lifetime model Chakraborty (2004) and its revised 
version published in Poverty Trap (2006). Chakraborty endogenizes longevity 
through the probability of the survival of individuals from the first period to the next in 
an overlapping generations model. The probability of survival varies with the level of 
tax-funded health capital. Chakraborty finds supportive evidence for his hypothesis 
from an empirical analysis of the relationship between life expectancy and long-term 
economic growth. 
The present paper attempts to endogenize depreciation of physical capital through 
an overlapping generations model which includes a probability function for the 
survival of productive capital. The probability that capital will remain unscathed from 
the first period of an individual’s life to the next depends upon the accumulated level 
of tax-funded protective capital. By modelling the probability of survival, this paper 
aims to account for different reactions to the possibility of catastrophic events from 
economies which are at different stages of development. The model predicts a low 
level of either productive or protective capital would result in stagnation.  
In contrast to Chakraborty (2004), we suppose constant longevity that eliminates 
an impact on the propensity to save, but introduces a new element because the 
propensity to save depends on the remuneration of saving. It might be interpreted 
that one foundation of endogeneity of the saving rate is replaced by another one; 
however, this fact did not result in poverty trap when the Chakraborty’s logarithmic 
utility function is investigated. The main contribution of our work is the unique 
methodology to analyze the implication of CRRA utility into the theory of poverty trap 
and the role of ‘intertemporal elasticity of substitution’ in emergence of an escapable 
or an inescapable trap.  
Although disasters are rarely associated with poverty traps in the theory of growth, 
the concept of rare disasters has been used by Rietz (1988) and Barro (2006) to 
explain the equity premium puzzle. Barro (2006) employs a stochastic model to 
calibrate the equity premium. Our deterministic model can be viewed as the first step 
into a more general stochastic model. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II further distinguishes between protective 
capital and production capital and explains its importance in the set up of the model.  
In section III, different types of poverty traps are defined. The model is defined in 
section IV, which examines the effects of protective capital on capital accumulation 
in an OLG model. The role of two different shapes of productive capital survival 
probability functions, pulse and general form, on the behaviour of the model are also 
discussed in this section. Next, some policies on poverty reduction, such as external 
 
 
capital injection and wage taxation system, are discussed in section V.  The paper 
concludes in section VI. 
 
2. PROTECTIVE VERSUS PRODUCTIVE CAPITAL 
In the last half of the previous century, the theory of growth has persuasively 
emphasized the role of the accumulation of productive capital as the explanatory 
cause of development. One strand of models identifies different types of capital such 
as physical, human, and social capital as stimulants of growth. The common premise 
of these models is that the role of capital in an economy is solely to be productive. 
The second branch focuses on productivity itself. These models associate the 
observed ongoing, widespread, and growing inequality in standards of living within 
and among nations with the variety of productivity levels observed around the globe.  
It is conventionally believed that in addition to the levels of different types of 
capital and the observed varieties of productivities, some other still unknown factors 
are involved in accounting for the magnitude of per capita income gap around the 
world. The proposed model introduces a new function for capital which is called 
protective capital. Protective capital preserves productive capital against hazards. 
Natural calamities such as droughts, tsunamis, earthquakes, floods, landslides, 
hurricanes, epidemics, and volcanoes as well as man-made disasters such as 
depressions, credit crunches, industrial events, transportation accidents, wars, ethnic 
tensions, social or political unrests, pollution, and climate change all endanger the 
quality of human life. The question is how the impacts of some catastrophic events 
with the same magnitude drastically vary across nations. Why does an earthquake 
claim more than 100,000 lives in Haiti and still remarkable stronger one in Chile 
leaves less than 500 victims? (Wikipedia) 
This paper argues that a high level of protective capital is the main contributor to 
the relatively restricted damage of an earthquake in one of the two countries. Thus, a 
direct upshot of the recognition of the role of protective capital is to increase its 
investment level. 
When it comes to funding protective capital, its stark distinction from productive 
capital appears. Private investors look at the expected rate of return for any 
investment to decide whether to invest in productive capital. Therefore, investors 
continue funding productive capital as long as the expected return meets the 
investors’ required return. However, for protective capital, the concept of rate of 
return is less clear and depends upon the expected loss of each catastrophic event 
as well as the expected return of productive capital. In addition, protection usually 
requires collective actions and market failure can be a consequence of investing in 
protective capital only through free markets. Therefore, in the present model 
productive capital is funded through free market in contrast with protective capital 
that is funded by levying wage tax.  
This setting resembles Chakrobarty’s model with health capital; however, here we 
consider a minimal role for protective capital. Protective capital only boosts the 
expected return of capital and does not change the longevity of individuals. Our 
objective is to present that the impact of protective capital accumulation on the 
individuals’ expectation can be a sufficient condition for escapable or inescapable 






3. TYPES OF POVERTY TRAP 
The classical definition of poverty trap is ‘any self-reinforcing mechanism which 
causes poverty to persist’ Azariadis & Stachurski (2005). A more technical 
description is that a poverty trap occurs when, in a multi-equilibria growth model, the 
mechanisms of free markets would be unable to move the economy from a low-
income steady-state to any of high-income steady-states without an intervention from 
external sources or from government. In this line, we define three types of poverty 
trap: (1) inescapable poverty trap, (2) alternating poverty trap, and (3) semi-trap. 
Inescapable poverty trap: in the framework of the proposed model, this is a type 
of poverty trap that external capital injection would be ineffective for escaping from 
the trap. In other words, this is a case where no amount of foreign financial aid would 
be able to lead the economy towards the other high-income steady-state level(s). In 
turn, if capital injection would possibly be effective in poverty reduction in a poverty 
trap, this is called an ‘escapable trap’. 
Alternating poverty trap: An alternating trap occurs when an economy alternates 
between two inferior and superior income levels. Neither of the two levels are 
steady-sates, though the combination of the two can be observed as a mixed 
equilibrium. 
Semi-trap: it is a steady-state in a multi-equilibria free-market economy, which the 
economy is able to surpass the low-income but never reaches the potentially high-
income steady-state and will be entrapped in an equilibrium between the two 
extreme levels.   
 
4. PROTECTIVE CAPITAL AND OLG MODELS 
 
We assume a standard Diamond-type two-period overlapping generations model 
(Diamond, 1965). Individuals save a portion of their wage during the first period in 
hopes of consuming the entirety of the invested funds plus the returns from capital 
market in the second stage of their life. Yet, there is a possibility that at the end of 
the first period investors could lose their entire investment due to a disastrous event. 
The probability of the loss depends upon the stock of tax-funded protective capital. 
A. The Environment 
A constant number of individuals cohorts, v = 0, 1, 2… are born during each period 
and inelastically supply their labour force for only one period in exchange for a 
wage,   . Individuals of each cohort live for two periods and during the second 
period of their life supply no labour force, but consume their savings plus returns 
from capital market.  
In addition to productive capital, the economy accumulates protective capital, 
which increases the probability of the survival of productive capital. We assume that 
at the end of the first period of the cohort’s life a major disastrous event takes place. 
In the absence of protective capital, a low portion of productive capital would remain 
for the second period of individuals’ lives. Therefore, in addition to the traditional 
depreciation rate of productive capital, it is also important to define         
  
→ [         ]  such that               , as a probability function of productive 
capital survival when the protective capital level is qt ≥ 0. With no investment in 
protective capital, there is only a small chance of productive capital survival. This low 
probability of survival is denoted by     . In turn, as protective capital is accumulated 
over time, the probability of productive capital survival converges towards an upper 
 
 
limit     . Accordingly, disastrous events are expected to destroy         of the 
entire stock of productive capital. 
The probability function,      , is increasing in the stock of protective capital, q, 
and satisfies 
     →               ,                Assumption (2) 
     →               ,                           Assumption (3) 
        
2                    Assumption (4) 
Individuals maximize their expected CRRA utility function over the two periods: 
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 ⁄   ,     (1) 
subject to two budget constraints:  
  
              , 
    
   ̃       , 
where       Moreover,    is the amount of savings at time t and  ̃    is the expected 
total return from the capital market on saving      
The production function                is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns 
to scale, capital shares of          and A > 0. Therefore, in per worker terms 
         ,           (2) 
where    stands for per worker productive capital. We also assume: 
                            Assumption (1) 
In a competitive free market, wage and capital rent rates are determined as 
follows: 
           
  ,             (3) 
         
       ,            (4) 
where     [   ]  is the depreciation rate of productive capital. Also, since each 
period lasts for half of a cohort’s life, it can be assumed that        
Therefore, the expected return from the capital market,  ̃   , is the gross return from 
the capital market,   , multiplied by the chance of survival,     . 
 ̃            . 
Despite the fact that disastrous events are systematic, undiversified risks in the 
economy, we assume that each country takes actuarially fair insurance from 
international institutions and the size of the economy and the damages from 
disasters are such small and uncorrelated with the rest of the world that the 
international institutions do not require risk premium. This assumption makes    
deterministic. Also, Blanchard (1985) and Yari (1956) are followed to abstract from 
the risk associated with the expected return,     . In fact, we assume perfect 
annuities system with intermediation of mutual funds. These international insurance 
setup and annuities system guarantee the deterministic  ̃   , which differs among 
countries depending upon the values of     . 
Protective capital is accumulated by the public sector through a flat wage tax rate 
  [   ] and depreciates at a constant rate     [   ].  
The law of motion for protective capital is 
                  .                                         
for all cohorts     with q0 > 0 as given.  
Similar to   , we assume        
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 Two functional forms that satisfy the properties of the probability function are      
         where   [   ] and            
  where     . 
 
 
         .                                         (5) 
Notably, the probability of disasters is unaffected by the value of    and    only 
impacts on the size of losses from a disaster. 
B. General Equilibrium 
Given the wage and capital rent rates and the deterministic structure of rate of 
return, individuals’ maximization process of their CRRA utility function subject to the 
budget constraints yields Euler’s equation: 
    
  
 (     ̃   )
 
  .         (6) 
The above equation shows how economies with different ‘intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution’, (θ ) respond to a change in expected return of capital,  ̃    .  
Then equations (3), (4), and (6) yield the saving function: 
     
( (          ̃   
   )⁄ )         
{               
        ⁄ }             
        (7) 
The capital stock in period t + 1 would be equal to the level of savings in period t: 
     { (             
         )⁄ }             
           (8) 
  Then we have: 
      (             
         )               
            (9) 
One obvious steady state solution for equation (8) is    ; however, there is no 
closed form solution for the other possible steady states. As follows we introduce a 
dynamic analysis for the other unique stable steady state, based on the method of 
Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004). Thus we define average productivity of capital 
      ̅
     and rewrite equation (9) at the steady-state level: 
      [    ̅]
                   ̅       (10) 
The above transformation towards average productivity of capital facilitates the 
analysis of steady state solutions. Also, it is customary to analyze the dynamics of 
Diamond-type models by describing the properties of the law of motion of the capital 
k. Since it is impossible to rearrange equation (9) in the form of           , there is 
no exact analysis for CRRA models. In the following we attempt to offer a reasonable 
approximation which enables us to analyse the dynamics of CRRA models. 
Although the LHS of equation (10) does hold for all the values of capital, the RHS is 
only valid for the steady state levels. The general form of RHS for all levels of capital 
is              
     ⁄               . Nevertheless, the following equation 
suffices for dynamic analysis by adopting the linear approximation: 
      [     ]
                           (11) 
 In order to investigate the role of protective capital on the possibility of the poverty 
trap, we assume a pulse function for the probability of productive capital survival.  
C. Pulse Probability Function 
Initially, it may be supposed that the survival probability of productive capital is a 
pulse function. In other words, there is a threshold, Q, for protective capital to be 
effective:  
      {
                  
 
                 
    
In the case of      the probability of the survival of productive capital from 
disastrous events is low             . In this circumstance, depending upon the 
economy’s utility function, young individuals prefer to consume more or less of their 
 
 
wages immediately. As            , the model converges to a standard CRRA-
Cobb Douglas OLG model with a unique stable steady-state level.  
Accordingly, it may be further supposed that  ̅    represents the steady-state 
level of    i.e.          ̅   . The average productivity of capital at steady-state 
level,  ̅   , may be defined as     
     ̅   
   
 and equation (8) at the steady-state 
level can be rewritten: 
      [     
 ]
   
                 
  .     (9) 
The same analogy can be employed in the case of             : 
   
  
 [     
     ]
   
                 
  .               (10) 
The left hand side of equations (9) and (10) are defined as     
 
  
 [   ]
   
  and the right-hand side as              ; both can take indices of 
max or min. FIGUREs 1, 2, and 3 illustrate equations (9) and (10) when   is less 
than, greater than, or equal to 1, respectively. The RHS’s of equations (9) and (10) 
are the same line (              which is a straight line with the slope of 
           and goes through the origin. A social planner might reach the required 
outcome by changing the slope of L through fine tuning of tax rate τ.  
If the stock of capital in an economy is below the steady-state level,     ̅, then 
with the accumulation of capital the value of    approaches to  ̅; and equivalently the 
value of average productivity of capital,   , decreases from infinity towards  
 . This is 
presented in FIGUREs 1, 2, and 3, where due to a decrease in   , the values of L 
decreases and the values of   may increase, decrease, or remain constant 
depending upon θ. No matter what the value of θ  is, the gap between L and   
decreases as more capital accumulates. Similar logic is valid when the initial capital 
stock is above the steady-state level,     ̅. 
In the discussion that follows, the possibility of poverty traps are investigated and 
an attempt is made to analyze policies to avoid or escape the trap. It is noteworthy 
that all of the analyses are based on the values of    instead of   . Care must be 
taken regarding the inverse relation between the two values: as capital stock,   , 
goes to infinity, the average productivity of capital,   , goes to zero. Furthermore, 
whenever the two values of    are compared, the higher (lower)    is associated with 
the lower (higher)   .  
Two parameters have more significant impacts on the behaviour of the model: (1) 
the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, 1/θ; and (2) the protective capital threshold 
level, Q. 
As mentioned, the shapes of      and      depend upon the value of    As   is 
equal to, less than, or greater than 1, the shape of   would be a straight line, or a 
decreasing convex, or an increasing concave curve. In any event, the equations (9) 
and (10) have unique stable steady-state solutions which result from the intersection 
of functions L and . Barro & Sala-i-Martin (2004). 
The inverse value of intertemporal elasticity of substitution, θ, determines which 
steady-state level,      
  or     
 , would be higher. In the case of     , the curve of 
     is below the curve of      and both are decreasing convex curves (FIGURE 1). 
Therefore,      intersects L first at a higher  
   Thus,     
       
  which is 
equivalent to  ̅     ̅      In such an economy, as the capital survival probability 
increases, young individuals favour higher savings over early consumption, which 
results in lower consumption in the first period of their lives and higher consumption 






On the contrary, if    , the curve of      is above      and both are increasing 
concave curves (FIGURE 2). Therefore,      intersects L first at a higher  
   Thus  
    
       
  , which is equivalent to  ̅     ̅      In such a situation, the elasticity of 
the saving function with respect to the probability of capital survival becomes 
negative        , and income effects dominate substitution effects. Therefore, 




Another case occurs when the utility function is logarithmic      . Individuals 
with logarithmic utility functions do not vary their investment decisions with the 
changes in the expected rate of return or the probability of capital survival. As 
FIGURE 3 illustrates in such cases, both curves of      and      collapse into one 
single straight line              




A poverty trap might occur depending upon the value of the threshold level of 
protective capital Q relative to the steady-state levels  ̅    and  ̅   . In order to 
facilitate the current analysis of poverty trap based on the values of   , an equivalent 
value for Q is defined. From equation 5, protective capital in the second period is 
fully funded through a given wage tax rate: 
               
  .            (11) 
Then, the minimum productive capital that is required to raise the level of protective 
capital to above the threshold level Q is 
           ⁄  
            (12) 
Similar to     
   and     
      equations (9) and (10), 
        
                 ⁄         . This is the equivalent value of    that is 
associated with the threshold level Q. 
Depending upon the relative value of    to     
   and     
    and for the cases 
wherein   is less than, greater than, or equal to 1, an economy can be in no trap, in 
an escapable, or an inescapable trap, or even in alternating traps. Propositions 1 to 
5 further distinguish these different possibilities.  
Proposition 1. In a CRRA-Cobb Douglas OLG model with a pulse probability 
function of productive capital survival, a poverty trap does not exist if     
        
        
      
Proof: If    , then     
       
   (FIGURE 1, Panel (a)). The first situation is that the 
economy starts from a stock of productive capital level,    , for which       
 ̅     ̅   (equivalently            
       
   ). Since       , protection is not 
effective yet and the capital stock grows on a path towards  ̅   , or equivalently 
average productivity of capital decreases towards     
  . However, the value of    will 
reach    before  ̅    , and at this level of capital, protection is activated, which jumps 
to the maximum probability of capital survival. In short, the path towards steady-state 
shifts from      to    . Higher capital survival probability implies a higher expected 
rate of return for capital, and, since    , substitution effects dominates income 
 
 
effects and the economy tend more towards saving. Capital is accumulated on a new 
path towards a new steady states level of  ̅          
   ) and surpasses  ̅          
   ) 
without being entrapped.  
If     , then     
       
   (FIGURE 2, Panel (a)). It can be supposed that the 
economy starts from a stock of productive capital level    , in which         
 ̅     ̅     (equivalently           
       
    ). Again, since      , protection 
is not effective yet and the capital stock grows on the path towards  ̅   , but reaches 
    earlier and jumps to the new path towards  ̅   . The difference between this 
case and the case when     is that now income effects dominate substitution 
effects. In such an economy, as higher protection of capital is activated (    
reaches   ), individuals increase their early consumption. Notably, the steady-state 
capital stock at the maximum probability of capital survival is lower than the steady 
state at the minimum probability of capital survival ( ̅     ̅   )  because of 
individuals preferences for early consumption. 
In both cases of    if       , then the economy is on the path of       and will 
move towards  ̅    with no trap.   
Proposition 2. In a CRRA-Cobb Douglas OLG model with a pulse probability 
function of productive capital survival, an inescapable poverty trap exists if     
        
         
       
Proof: If the initial level of capital stock is below   ̅   , then the capital stock 
converges towards  ̅    without hitting    . We suppose that a remarkable measure 
of foreign aid is injected into the economy increasing the level of capital stock above 
the threshold level;        The proposed model will show that capital stock again 
converges to the trap level of  ̅   .  
If    , then     
        
   (FIGURE 1, Panel (c)). In that case, the economy starts 
from   , wherein         ̅     ̅     (equivalently            
       
   ). 
Since      , protection is already effective and the capital stock decreases on the 
path towards  ̅   ; or equivalently, average productivity of capital decreases towards 
the level of     
  . However, since     ̅   , the value of    drops below    before 
reaching  ̅    and at this level of capital, protection becomes deactivated and leads 
to the minimum probability of capital survival which then triggers a shift from      
to    . The economy will be entrapped in the new steady states level of  ̅          
   ) 
and foreign aid fails to achieve  ̅          
  ).  
If    , then     
       
   (FIGURE 2, Panel (c)). We suppose that the economy 
starts from a stock of productive capital level   in which         ̅     ̅     
(equivalently            
       
   ). Again, since       , protection has already 
been effective and the capital stock decreases on a path towards  ̅   , however it 
drops below    before reaching  ̅   , which then triggers a shift from      to    . 
The economy will be entrapped in the steady-states level of  ̅          
  ) and never 
achieve  ̅          
   ).   
A widely-recognized method of escaping any form of poverty trap is to inject 
productive capital from the outside. However, as long as the level of capital injection 
is below the gap,       ̅    , the economy is unable to maintain the level of 
protective capital above the threshold level and remains in the trap. When the 
injected capital exceeds   through a big push, the economy might be able to obtain 
enough production in order to invest in protective capital and maintain its level above 
 
 
Q. In this case, individuals preferences play a significant role. Proposition 3 and 4 
demonstrates this situation. 
Proposition 3. In a CRRA-Cobb Douglas OLG model with a pulse probability 
function of productive capital survival, if     and      
          
   then an 
escapable poverty trap exists. 
Proof: It is supposed that the initial capital stock is below  ̅    or equivalently 
       
   (FIGURE 1, Panel (b)). Capital stock converges towards  ̅    on the path 
of    . At this inferior steady-state level, any external capital injection below the gap 
of        ̅    is futile as the economy converges back to the steady-state level of 
 ̅     However, an external capital injection above the gap level of   activates the 
higher protection for productive capital and shifts the economy to a new path of 
     towards the superior steady-state level of  ̅      
An important point here is the role of intertemporal elasticity of substitution (1/  ). 
Since    , substitution effects dominate income effects; thus, when the economy 
shifts to the new path of     , individuals tend to save more and this helps further 
the accumulation of productive capital towards a superior steady-state of  ̅     In 
contrast, Proposition 4 demonstrates a situation in which income effects dominate 
substitution effects. As a result, when the economy shifts to the new path, individuals 
increase their early consumption such that the superior path cannot be sustained 
and the economy arrives at an ongoing alternation between the two paths. 
Proposition 4. In a CRRA-Cobb Douglas OLG model with a pulse probability 
function of productive capital survival, if     and      
          
  , then an 
alternating poverty trap exists. 
Proof: It is supposed that the initial capital stock is below  ̅    or        
   (FIGURE 
2, Panel (b)). Capital stock converges towards  ̅    on the lower path of     . 
However, before reaching  ̅     it strikes the threshold level of      or equivalently      
which activates capital protection and the economy shifts to the upper path of    . 
On the new path, the current capital stock is above the new steady-state level of 
 ̅    or equivalently        
  . Therefore, the economy starts to consume more and 
save less towards a new steady-state level which is lower than the current amount. 
Consequently, the capital stock level drops below the threshold level of  ̅  and again 
the economy shifts back to    . In this situation, the economy will not reach either 
of the two steady-state levels, but alternate about  ̅     
The alternating poverty traps might appear unrealistic as the economy alternates 
between maximum and minimum probability of capital survival. This situation stems 
from the strong assumption of the pulse probability function. In actuality, the 
probability of capital survival rises gradually as protective capital accumulates. In 
section D, a general probability function is employed that substitutes the alternating 
poverty trap with a steady-state between the two extreme levels of  ̅    and  ̅     
Using CRRA utility, this study emphasizes on individuals’ preferences and thereby 
reaches unique results. It is noteworthy that in such situations the literature of growth 
economics usually considers a logarithmic utility function which is the case of    ; 
however, as FIGURE 3 illustrates such an assumption will result in disappearance of 
traps and a zero investment level in protective capital as the optimal policy. 
 
D. General Form Probability Function 
In this section, the conclusions in C are extended by employing a general probability 
function that satisfies assumptions 2, 3, and 4. For the new probability function, two 
 
 
thresholds,    and   , are assumed as the lower and upper limits for protective 
capital to be effective in incremental enhancement of probability capital survival. The 
probability of productive capital survival is defined as 
      {
                                                      
                                              
                                                        
   
where        is continuous and increasing in q; that is      
   ,            and 
            
Similar to the case of pulse probability function, the minimum levels of productive 
capital that are required to raise the level of protective capital to the threshold levels 
of    and    are defined as 
                 ⁄  
    ,               and                   ⁄  
                    
                                                                                                            
Again, similar to   : 
         
                      ⁄  
       and 
          
                      ⁄  
       . 
This is the equivalent value of    that is associated with the threshold levels 
   and  . 
Depending upon the values of    and   , relative to     
   and     
   and for the 
cases of   being less than, or greater than one, an economy can be in no trap, in an 




The introduction of a general probability function reaffirms most of the results of 
the less-complicated pulse probability. Therefore, the results of Proposition 1 of no-
trap conditions can simply be extended to the conditions of        
                
   
in the case of     (FIGURE 4, Panel (a)) and           
   in the case of     
(FIGURE 5, Panel (a)), respectively. Additionally, the results of Proposition 2 
regarding an inescapable trap is extendable to the conditions of         
            
    
   in the case of     (FIGURE 4, Panel (c)) and           
   in the case of 




In a more subtle way, the escapable trap of Proposition 3 can be extended to a 
general probability model when        
                
   in the case of     
(FIGURE 4, Panel (b)). An economy with a low stock of capital accumulates the two 
types of capital and thereby average capital productivity declines on the curve 
of    . However, a minimum threshold level triggers higher protection at    before 
reaching     
  . As a result, the economy shifts to a path below     and above    . 
This new path has a lower steady-state level of    that is lower than the current level 
of     The economy continues accumulating capital and the path of   incrementally 
shifts downward until it reaches a steady-state level of          
  on a path which is 
called    . In case of a minor capital injection into the economy, the value of    
drops below          
  on a new path which is below    . The new steady-state level 
of this path is greater than     This new economy with incrementally higher capital 
 
 
stock relative to the trap and lower average capital productivity relative to          
  
would increases early consumption and eventually move back to          
   
While an incremental capital injection would be futile in this economy, a big push 
could change the situation. In the case of a capital injection large enough to raise the 
value of   above    , which would force the level of   below   , the level of capital 
protection would attain the maximum possible level and the path of the economy 
would shift to       However, in this situation,           
  . Thus, the economy 
would consume more and invest less towards     . However, before reaching     
  , 
the value    would drop below    and the economy would shift incrementally upward 
to a new path of . Finally, it would reach a superior steady-state,          
  , which is 
located on    . This is a new steady-state level and if the value of    marginally 
exceeds          
 ,    will return to this equilibrium. The fact that a minimal capital 
injection is unable to release the economy from the inferior equilibrium indicates that 
this is a trap; meanwhile, the reality that a big push would lead the economy to a 
superior steady-state level justifies the oxymoron of ‘escapable trap’. 
As mentioned above, if the value of    goes incrementally beyond          
  or 
drops incrementally below          
 , then the value of    would return to the relevant 
stable equilibrium, and such a movement indicates that there is another 
equilibrium,          
         
            
 , above which the value of    increases and 
below which the value of    decreases. This new equilibrium is unstable and is a 
result of the intersection of line L with the path of       .  
The conditions of        
                
   are sufficient conditions for having an 
escapable trap. In fact, the necessary conditions are less restrictive and if    
       
                   
   then the economy has an escapable trap with two equilibria. 
Notably, if      
            
  , then      
           
  . In turn, if         
         
  , 
then     
           
  . If both conditions simultaneously hold, then        
   would be the 
third stable equilibrium.  
The counterparty of an escapable trap when     is an economy with a single 
equilibrium between the two extreme equilibria which is called a ‘semi-trap’. Although 
a semi-trap has an edge over the inferior steady-state,     
  , with higher consumption 
and capital levels, it is still dominated by the superior steady-state ,     
  . Therefore, 
the semi-trap in the case of general probability function is more intuitive than the 
alternating trap in the case of pulse probability function. 
Proposition 5. In a CRRA-Cobb Douglas OLG model with a general probability 
function of productive capital survival, if     and         
        then there exists 
a unique steady-state (semi-trap),    
  , where     
      
        
  . 
Proof: As        
        
  , the economy keeps capital accumulation towards     
   on 
     and higher protection is activated as the average capital productivity falls 
bellow   . Therefore, the curve of φ shifts incrementally upward and since line L is 
increasing, the new steady-state (intersection of φ and L) is larger than the previous 
one,     
       
  . In turn, the capital accumulation process ensures that the new 
value of    is smaller than the previous one. Thus, the gap between    and the 
steady-state level decreases. As this process repeats, the gap approaches to zero 
and    reaches its steady-state level,   
 .  
If the value of     drops below     
  , the new path φ would be lower than    . 
Then either the new    is located on the line L, which means the economy obtains 
multiple equilibria on the line L, or its value is lower than the steady state level and 




On the other hand, if the economy starts with a large capital stock and the value of 
   is less than     
  , then, accordingly, same arguments is valid for a decreasing gap 
process that guarantees extending    to its steady-state,   
 .  
Again, if    goes beyond     
  , the new path φ would be higher than     . Then, 
either the new    is located on the line L which means the economy obtains multiple 
equilibria on the line L or its value is above the steady-state level and will revert to 
the value of   
 . 
In this economy either there is a unique equilibrium,   
    
   or infinite equilibria 
on the line L between   
  and   
 .   
5. POLICY DISCUSSION 
One of the conclusions of the present paper is that lack of protective capital can be 
an explanatory factor for the fact that a large amount of the foreign aid awards to 
LDCs or sovereign loans to HIPCs fails to bring about the expected economic 
development. In fact, the injection of productive capital into these nations can be 
ineffective because the productive capital will be wasted if the required level of 
protective capital has not yet been attained. Therefore, focusing on ‘Productive 
Capital Waste Management’ (PCWM) is the direction recommended here. 
Two types of policies regarding PCWM are ‘injecting protective capital’ and/or 
‘funding protective capital through higher wage tax rates’. A protective capital 
injection is an external policy that can be adopted by international institutions such 
as the World Bank and the IMF. Relative to the current policy of a productive capital 
injection, the protective capital injection is a more direct treatment, focusing on the 
source of the problem, which is capital waste. In contrast, raising wage tax rates is 
an internal policy which can be implemented by governments.  
Protective Capital Injection: In a country with a developed fiscal system, a 
portion of the wage of young individuals is taken by the government and is invested 
as protective capital. However, any obstacle that interrupts this process, such as lack 
of an effective taxation system, misallocation of resources due to corruption, or 
investment in productive rather than protective capital, can entrap the economy in 
poverty. These obstacles make any productive capital injection ineffective due to a 
high possibility of capital waste. Therefore, based on the proposed model, an 
external injection of protective capital is preferred over productive capital.  
Nevertheless, an external aid system that aims at raising the stock of protective 
capital to a level above the threshold can bypass the obstacles and draw the 
economy into a new world of high probability of capital survival. Nonetheless, the 
unfortunate result of the proposed model is that the injection of protective or 
productive capital would be effective only in a very specific situation: when      
and     
          
  . It is worth to notice that literature of economics often consider 
a value of      .  As previously mentioned, in the case of inescapable traps, capital 
injection is ineffective as higher capital would be consumed and have no impact on 
the steady-state level.  
Easterly (2009) conducts a comprehensive literature review on the effectiveness 
of Western aid effort towards Africa. His survey contrasts ‘transformational’ approach 
to ‘marginal’ approach. In order to distinguish the two approaches, he considers the 
ambition or goal of each approach. The goal of transformational approach is a large 
permanent gain in an economic indicator or a number of social indicators, at the 
aggregate level. In a marginal approach, the ambition of the aid program is to solve a 
very specific problem of a target population.  
 
 
The literature reports disappointing results from transformational approach, 
however, evidences some successes for marginal approach. It seems that there is a 
link between the transformational / marginal approaches and the two concepts of 
protective and productive capital. In fact, most of the transformational aids are 
focused on injecting productive capital into a poor society opposite to many of 
marginal projects such as health-related campaigns which are in nature protective. 
As a result, the ineffectiveness of transformation approach can be interpreted as the 
failure of productive capital injection policy, and the limited success of marginal 
approach can be seen as empirical potential for research on protective capital. 
 
Increase in Wage Tax Rates: A social planner can make two impacts on an 
economy through higher wage tax rates. First, irrespective of the value of θ, a higher 
tax rate indicates a steeper L, which in turn increases the steady-state levels, 
    
   and     
   , while      and      remain the same. Second, a higher tax rate 
increases the threshold levels    or the pair of    and   .  
As FIGURE 1 illustrates, when    , the necessary and sufficient condition for a 
no-trap situation is that     
      or equivalently   ̅      . Here, a sufficient 
condition,      
     , is considered. From equation 9, it can be concluded that in the 
case of pulse probability function and       , a wage tax rate,  
         , exists if 
and only if               . Replacing the equivalent amount for    and further 
simplification yields 
      ⁄                 .      (13) 
Condition 13 sets a limit for the maximum value of Q that can be supported by a 
wage taxation system in order to avoid a poverty trap. As a result, if the required 
threshold of protective capital for a shift from low to high capital survival probability is 
very high relative to the value of Total Factor Productivity, A, then no wage tax rate 




FIGURE 6 depicts the values of the right-hand side of condition 13 for the ranges 
of             and        . Based on this FIGURE, the right-hand side varies in a 
range between 0 and 0.3. For example when       , a wage tax rate of 
approximately 0.75 would yield the highest value for 
    
 
, which is 0.3. Therefore, if 
Q is located in the range of        
 
   ⁄           , there will be a tax rate which 
allows the economy escape from a vicious cycle of poverty. This potential reflects 
the importance of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) improvement in poverty reduction. 
In fact, as A increases one percent, the taxation system can support a 1.43 percent 
higher value for Q.  
One of the results of the argument above is that the wage tax system cannot 
support relatively high values of Q in nations with low TFP levels. Therefore, 
enhancement of productivity would assist poverty reduction programs from two 
directions: first, higher productivity implies higher income and therefore, more 
investment in protective capital level; and, second, higher productivity enables the 
economy to support higher threshold level of Q through wage tax. Therefore, any 




On the other hand, a high tax rate reduces the individuals utility of current 
consumption. Another problem is to find a tax rate that maximizes individuals’ utility 
over both periods of their lives. This tax rate,    , is an optimal rate that maximizes 
the following problem when the optimal choices of individuals are given: 
   
 
         
      
    
where V is an intertemporal welfare function and   
  and     
 are individual’s optimal 
choice, from Euler’s equation and budget constraints.  
As a result, a social planner faces two separate questions that might arrive at a 
dilemma: whether to select a tax rate that maximizes the utility of today’s generation 
over its lifespan and remain in a trap forever, or once adopt a higher tax rate which 
releases the economy from the trap but at the cost of lower utility for the present 
generation. This dilemma appears more problematic in a democracy in which the 
future generation has no voting rights and the present generation is reluctant to 
sacrifice its early consumption. This poverty trap model once again reiterates that 
development requires a ‘big push’, however, in protection rather than production. 
 
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
An extensive body of knowledge exists regarding the poverty trap as a self-
reinforcing mechanism in which a free market fails to develop. The present work 
provides theoretical explanations for the situations wherein not only free markets fail 
but also interventions, internal or external, are partially or completely ineffective in 
poverty reduction. Two factors contribute to these striking results: first, the concept of 
protection of productive capital; and second, individuals’ preferences that shape their 
consumption choice in reaction to any rise in the expected rate of return of 
investments. 
It is worth to notice that as Guvenen (2006) provides evidence, we can consider 
heterogeneity in intertemporal elasticity of substitution and assume low elasticity 
(high θ) for the poor versus high elasticity (low θ) for the rich. One of the results of 
this study is to shed light on the contradicting historical experiences on foreign aid. 
The success of Marshal Plan for post-WWII Western Europe and the failure of 
foreign aid to sub-Saharan Africa can be attributed to escapable or inescapable traps 
resulting from differences in elasticity of substitution. 
This paper is an initial step towards recognition of the role of protective capital in 
development economics. Further theoretical work is required to study the process of 
protective capital creation and the role of political agents. How political incentives 
might result in underinvestment in protection and what are the interactions between 
protective capital accumulation and institutions? 
The introduction of thresholds of protective capital in the probability functions 
accounts for a number of our results. It is reasonable to relax this assumption using 
continuous probability functions. 
Further work is also required to examine the empirical relevance of inescapable 
and escapable poverty traps. If our view of underdevelopment is valid then there 
should be a relationship between long-term stagnation and LDCs’ reactions to 
foreign aid. Another quantitative exercise can focus on the calibration of the low and 
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FIGURE 1  
The steady-state level for a pulse probability function of productive capital survival 
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(c) With Inescapable Trap  
 
 
FIGURE 2  
The steady-state level for a pulse probability function of productive capital survival 
when     
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The steady-state level for a pulse probability function of productive capital survival 













  FIGURE 4  
The steady-state level for a general probability function of productive capital survival 
when     
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The steady-state level for a general probability function of productive capital survival 
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FIGURE 6  
Values of 
    
 
 for             and         
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